For feedback: final draft on the EU Kids Act

Dear everyone,

Please find below our final draft on the EU Kids Act. Please don’t hesitate to let us know if you have any final remarks on the paper.


The European Pirates support the objective of making digital services safer for children. Online abuse, exploitative design, unwanted contact and systems that encourage compulsive use deserve a serious response. The question is how to achieve that protection while respecting children’s rights, privacy, autonomy, freedom of expression and association, and the rights of adults who use the same services.

The European Commission’s proposal contains useful measures. These include stronger duties for large platforms, restrictions on manipulative design, a distinction between personalisation chosen by a minor and personalisation inferred from behaviour, and specific safeguards for AI companions and general conversational chatbots. The European Pirates supports the direction of these measures.

Our concern is that some parts of the proposal rely on mandatory age assurance, fixed account-access rules and detailed service-design requirements without sufficiently addressing anonymity, children’s evolving capacities, user control and independent scrutiny. Other important standards are left to later technical measures or codes of conduct. The enforcement framework also needs clearer safeguards for overlapping proceedings and stronger participation by affected groups.

Our other concerns include the practical consequences of mandatory age verification, the effect of the proposal on freedom of association and universal access, the transfer of technical design decisions to the state, the impact on gaming, and the justification for introducing a new regulatory instrument alongside existing EU law.

The European Pirates’ principal concerns and recommendations are as follows:

  1. Age assurance, privacy and mandatory verification: Although the proposal does not require every person to prove their age whenever they open any online account, the requirement to distinguish minors from adults on covered services means that users of those services will generally have to undergo age verification or another age-assurance process. The practical implications for adults, anonymity and ordinary access to online services must be acknowledged and assessed.

  2. Children’s autonomy and parental control: Fixed age thresholds and guardian-controlled accounts should recognise children’s evolving capacities and provide a proportionate route towards greater independence.

  3. Freedom of association and communication: Contact restrictions should protect children from demonstrable risks without unnecessarily limiting their ability to communicate, form groups and participate in online communities.

  4. State-mandated technology and user control: The proposal’s requirements concerning recommender systems and service design should not unnecessarily prevent users from controlling their own technology or exploring open and interoperable alternatives.

  5. Dark patterns and addictive design affect everyone: These practices can have a corrosive effect on the autonomy and wellbeing of adults as well as children. The case for addressing them should not depend exclusively on their impact on minors.

  6. Gaming and digital ownership: The Act’s application to online games and related services raises questions about access, design mandates, interoperability and the long-term availability of games. These issues are particularly relevant to the European Pirate Party’s engagement with the Stop Killing Games movement and its substantial public support.

  7. AI companions and general conversational chatbots: The proposal should define prohibited conduct more precisely, clarify how it interacts with the AI Act, and establish proportionate testing and monitoring requirements.

  8. Existing legislation and the case for a new Act: The Commission should explain why existing mechanisms under the GDPR, Digital Services Act (DSA), AI Act, audiovisual and consumer-protection legislation are insufficient, where enforcement has failed, and why a new instrument is necessary. The pending proposal commonly known as Chat Control should also be considered in this wider assessment, while clearly distinguishing it from legislation already in force.

  9. Universal access and digital rights: Restrictions on access for whole age groups must be assessed against the importance of access to information, education, communication, culture and participation online.

  10. Governance, enforcement and participation: The proposal should establish clearer coordination between regulatory authorities and ensure meaningful participation by minors, civil society and independent researchers in its development, implementation and review.

Our is that the protection offered by the Act must be justified by evidence, proportionate to the risks, consistent with existing legal rights and designed to avoid unnecessary restrictions on children and adults alike.

Who we are

The European Pirates is a pan-European political party representing Pirate Parties across Europe. We are rooted in the defence of digital rights, civil liberties, privacy, freedom of information and democratic participation.

We view digital infrastructure, including infrastructure created to protect children, as something that must itself remain accountable to the people it affects.

What we believe

The European Pirates’s manifesto supports privacy against both state and economic actors, including the ability to communicate anonymously and our opposition to mandatory age and identity verification schemes. It also supports self-determination and freedom of thought, free association and assembly, free and libre open-source software, and democratic participation in policymaking.

These principles apply to children as rights-holders. They do not mean that children should be left without protection. They mean that safeguards should address demonstrable risks without collecting more data than necessary, restricting children’s agency more than necessary, or transferring important technical and policy decisions away from meaningful public scrutiny.

Our assessment of the KIDS Act is based on two principles that should operate together: children need effective protection from serious digital harms, and the mechanisms used to provide that protection must respect their rights and developing capacity.

Why we are responding

The European Commission published its proposal for the EU KIDS Act, COM(2026) 681 final, on 17 September 2026. The proposal would establish EU-wide rules concerning minors’ access to certain social networking and video-sharing services, safety by design, age assurance, online games, app stores, AI companions and general conversational chatbots.

The European Pirates supports the proposal’s objective of protecting minors from harmful contact, exploitative design and unsafe digital environments. Our concern is whether the mechanisms proposed are sufficiently targeted, transparent and proportionate, and whether they preserve the rights and evolving capacities of the children they are intended to protect.

This submission considers the proposal in the context of The European Pirates manifesto commitments, including privacy, anonymity, self-determination, freedom of association, open-source software and democratic participation. It also considers the impact on gaming and the wider regulatory framework in which the proposal would operate.

The Commission should demonstrate not only that the risks addressed by the proposal are real, but also that the measures selected are likely to reduce those risks, that less restrictive alternatives would not achieve the same objectives, and that the benefits justify the additional obligations and restrictions.

This submission addresses these areas of concern:

  1. Age assurance, privacy and mandatory verification.

  2. Self-determination, parental control and personalisation.

  3. Freedom of association, contact restrictions and messaging.

  4. Recommender systems, design mandates and user control.

  5. Dark patterns and addictive design as a cross-cutting public concern.

  6. Gaming, digital ownership and access to online communities.

  7. AI companions and general conversational chatbots.

  8. Existing legislation, enforcement and the justification for a new Act.

  9. Universal access, freedom of information and participation online.

  10. Governance, enforcement and democratic participation.

Opportunities and risks

Opportunities

  • Greater responsibility for powerful providers. The proposal places significant obligations on providers that control the design and operation of major digital services. The European Pirates supports placing responsibility on those with the greatest ability to prevent harm rather than shifting that responsibility onto individual users.

  • Restrictions on manipulative design. The proposal addresses design practices that can encourage compulsive or excessive use and commercial manipulation of minors. The European Pirates supports measures that address demonstrably harmful design.

  • User-chosen personalisation. The distinction between preferences expressly selected by a minor and preferences inferred from behaviour is important because users should have meaningful control over how recommendation systems operate.

  • Accountability mechanisms. Audit, transparency and reporting requirements can support oversight, provided that their scope, methods and results are sufficiently clear and independent scrutiny is possible.

  • Recognition of AI-specific risks. The proposal recognises that AI companions and general conversational chatbots can create risks that are not identical to those associated with conventional social media.

Risks requiring improvement

  • Age assurance can create privacy risks beyond the immediate age check if the wider verification chain allows issuance, presentation or contextual information to be linked.

  • Fixed account-access thresholds may insufficiently reflect children’s evolving capacities, particularly for older minors.

  • Contact safeguards need clearer operative standards and an explicit route towards greater autonomy as a child matures.

  • Design requirements should remain effective as services evolve and should be complemented by meaningful user control and, where appropriate, interoperability.

  • Mandatory age assurance on covered services has consequences for adults as well as minors. Even where a system reveals only an age threshold, it creates a verification requirement for users who need to demonstrate that they are above that threshold.

  • The proposal’s implications for gaming and online communities require specific assessment rather than being treated as incidental to social media regulation.

  • The “emotional dependencies” standard for AI companions requires greater legal precision, while testing, memory and enforcement requirements need further clarification.

  • The relationship between the KIDS Act and existing EU legislation must be demonstrated in practice, including whether the existing rules are being adequately enforced and whether the new proposal would duplicate or conflict with them.

  • The proposal should provide clearer arrangements for overlapping regulatory frameworks and strengthen participation by minors, civil society and independent researchers.

Cross-cutting principles

  1. Child safety and identity infrastructure are not the same thing. Where age assurance is necessary, it should be limited to the specific legal purpose for which it is required.

  2. Privacy must be assessed across the complete technical chain. A system that discloses only an age threshold to a service may still create risks through issuers, intermediaries, logs, metadata or fallback mechanisms.

  3. Children are rights-holders. Protection should become stronger where risks are greater, while autonomy should increase as age and capacity develop.

  4. Restrictions on contact and design should address identifiable harms and remain proportionate to those harms.

  5. User control should be meaningful. Where the legislation gives users a right or choice, they should be able to exercise it without depending entirely on opaque platform systems.

  6. Open and interoperable technology can strengthen user control, but interoperability requirements must also protect children’s personal data, communications and security.

  7. Important standards should be sufficiently clear in the legislation itself. Codes of conduct and technical measures can support implementation, but should not become the only source of essential rights and obligations.

  8. Participation should continue beyond consultation during drafting. Minors, civil society and independent researchers should have meaningful opportunities to contribute to implementation, evaluation and review.

9. Restrictions that apply to children can also affect adults, including where a service requires users to prove that they are outside a restricted age group. The effects on adults’ privacy, anonymity and access must be assessed explicitly.

10. The proposal should be evaluated against existing legal obligations and enforcement practice before new obligations are introduced. The existence of a regulatory gap must be demonstrated, not assumed.


Section 1: Age assurance, privacy and mandatory verification

1.1 Who is verified?

The proposal does not require every person to prove their age whenever they open any online account. The scope of age assurance depends on the service and the relevant obligation. Article 29 establishes age-verification requirements for providers covered by the relevant account-access rules, while the proposal also provides for alternative age-assurance solutions and exceptions in defined circumstances. Even where an age-assurance system is intended to disclose only whether a user meets a particular threshold, it can affect access to services and create incentives to use a common verification infrastructure across different contexts.

However, the practical consequence must be stated clearly. If a covered service has to distinguish minors from adults before permitting account creation or access, it generally cannot know which users are minors without applying an age-assurance process. As a result, users of that service will generally have to undergo verification or another process capable of establishing that they meet the relevant age threshold. The requirement may apply to adults as well as minors, even though adults are not the group the restrictions are intended to protect.

This is an important distinction between the stated purpose of the measure and its practical scope. The proposal may not require universal identity verification across the entire internet, but it can create a verification requirement for everyone using services covered by the relevant obligations. This has implications for anonymity, privacy, access and the ability to use online services without disclosing information about oneself.

We call for strict purpose limitation. Age assurance created for a defined child-safety purpose should not gradually become a general gateway for ordinary internet participation. The legislation should specify the services, age thresholds and purposes for which verification may be required. Material extensions should require legislative scrutiny rather than being introduced indirectly through technical implementation.

The Commission should also explain how the verification requirement will work for existing users, users who cannot or do not wish to use the recommended verification application, and people whose age cannot be established reliably through the available means. The legislation should provide accessible alternatives and ensure that technical or administrative failure does not automatically result in disproportionate exclusion from lawful services.

1.2 How it works

The proposal establishes common requirements for age-assurance solutions. Article 27 requires high levels of accuracy, reliability, security, non-intrusiveness, privacy, data protection and non-discrimination. Article 28 contains additional safeguards concerning identification, tracking, targeting, advertising and profiling and requires the use of zero-knowledge proof. These safeguards are important and their effectiveness depends on how the complete system operates. The relevant chain includes the source of the identity or age information, the credential issuer, the presentation application, the device or operating-system intermediary, the service provider and any fallback or recovery mechanism.

We call for the full verification chain to be subject to the same privacy and accountability assessment. That assessment should identify which actors can observe credential issuance, credential presentation, timing, device or browser information, service-specific metadata, error and recovery events, and information capable of being correlated across services or over time. A zero-knowledge proof can significantly reduce what a verifier learns from a proof. It does not by itself establish that every other participant in the system is unable to link an individual to an issuance or presentation event.

The legislation should not treat a privacy-preserving technical design as sufficient evidence that the system is privacy-preserving in practice. That conclusion should be supported by independent testing of the complete implementation, including realistic attempts to correlate information across services and to exploit fallback mechanisms.

1.3 The issuer and unlinkability

The proposal’s privacy architecture should prevent age assurance from becoming a mechanism through which an issuer, verifier or intermediary can reconstruct an individual’s online activity. Therefore, issuer-side linkability needs to be treated as a specific technical and governance issue. The question is not simply whether an issuer is legally prohibited from misusing information; technical architecture should also minimise the amount of information available to any single actor.

We call for the legislation and its binding implementing requirements to prevent, to the greatest technically feasible extent, linkage between credential issuance and presentation across services. Issuance and presentation logs should be subject to strict retention limits, and their use for unrelated purposes should be prohibited. The system should be subject to independent security and privacy audits, with accessible summaries of audit findings and remediation published. Equivalent privacy protections should apply to fallback and recovery mechanisms.

The Commission should also assess whether an entity that issues credentials should be permitted to provide the presentation application. Where both functions are combined, the architecture should demonstrate how identity and service-use information are prevented from being linked.

We call for the division of responsibilities between the age-assurance provider and the digital service provider to be expressly codified in the Act. It should not be left solely to technical specifications, voluntary codes or future guidance.

The legislation should clearly establish that the age-assurance provider is responsible for verifying or attesting to the relevant age information, while the service provider is responsible for the service’s compliance with the Act and for acting on the age result. The service provider should not receive identity information that it does not need, and the age-assurance provider should not receive information about the user’s subsequent activity on the service.

The Act should also prohibit either party from using age-assurance information for unrelated profiling, advertising, tracking or account-linking purposes. The separation should be enforceable through defined duties, independent audit and effective remedies, rather than depending on a provider’s voluntary practices.

1.4 Metadata

A privacy-preserving proof may reveal only an age threshold to the service while surrounding information still reveals that an age check took place, when it took place or which service requested it. The significance of such metadata depends on the architecture and on whether it can be associated with other information.

We call for a published data-flow assessment identifying what each participant can observe, the purposes for which that information may be processed, applicable retention periods and safeguards against correlation. The assessment should cover operating-system and browser intermediaries as well as the service provider, issuer and user-facing wallet or application. Specific claims about technical disclosures should be supported by the current technical specification and independent testing rather than assumptions about how the system operates.

1.5 Parental credentials

The proposal requires Member States to provide at least one privacy-preserving electronic means through which a guardian can obtain and present an attestation of parental responsibility. The proposal also contains safeguards. The relevant means must be free, based on authentic sources and designed so that service providers or the public receive confirmation of the relevant relationship rather than unnecessary family information.

The system should minimise the information required to establish parental authority, protect the authentic sources from compromise, provide mechanisms to correct errors and ensure that families are not excluded because a particular digital route is unavailable or unsuitable.

We call for strict data minimisation, short and clearly defined retention periods, effective correction mechanisms, accessible alternatives and non-digital alternatives where necessary. Strong security requirements should also apply to authentic sources. Parental-responsibility attestations should not become a means for service providers to infer or retain unrelated family information.

1.6 Whose credential is it?

The proposal gives parents or guardians an important role in account creation and parental tools for younger users. Parental involvement can be valuable, particularly where children face serious risks online. However, the child remains a rights-holder.

A system designed around parental control should recognise that family circumstances differ and that parental involvement is not always safe or appropriate. Children should have access to information, support and age-appropriate routes to greater autonomy.

The legislation should distinguish child protection from general parental surveillance and should provide safeguards for situations in which ordinary parental control may itself create a risk.

Recommendations

  • R1.1 Require the age-assurance scheme to prevent, to the greatest technically feasible extent, linkage between credential issuance and presentation across the full verification chain.

  • R1.2 Limit age assurance to the services, thresholds and purposes specified in the Act. Material extensions should require ordinary legislative scrutiny.

  • R1.3 Set strict limits on issuance and presentation logs, retention and secondary use. Require independent audits and publish non-sensitive audit summaries.

  • R1.4 Require open technical specifications, independent reproducibility and meaningful security review. Open-source implementations and on-device approaches should qualify where they meet the same legal and technical standards.

  • R1.5 Ensure that children have age-appropriate routes to greater autonomy and access to support where ordinary parental control is unsafe or unsuitable.

  • R1.6 Codify in the Act the separation of responsibilities between age-assurance providers and digital service providers, including clear limits on the data each may access, retain and use.

  • R1.7 Require an assessment of the practical impact of verification on adults’ privacy, anonymity and access to covered services, including the availability of accessible and effective alternatives.


Section 2: Self-determination, parental control and personalisation

2.1 Account access and the age staircase

The proposal establishes access rules for specified social networking and video-sharing services, including a minimum age for autonomous account creation and a limited form of guardian-created access for certain minors aged 13 and 14. A fixed age threshold is administratively clear. It is also a blunt way of addressing differences in maturity, context and the risks presented by a particular service.

Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 24 of the Charter support taking children’s views and interests seriously, with due regard to their age and maturity.

We call for a progressive-autonomy model. Children aged 13 and 14 should have a defined route to appropriately protected independent accounts rather than being limited to guardian-controlled access until a single age threshold is reached. The safeguards should respond to the risks presented by particular features and services rather than assuming that all minors of the same age have identical needs.

The consultation process itself also requires scrutiny. Article 12 UNCRC protects the child’s right to express views freely in matters affecting them, with those views given due weight according to age and maturity. Article 24 of the Charter requires the child’s views to be considered in accordance with their age and maturity. These provisions do not mean that every legislative proposal requires a particular form of consultation, but they make children’s meaningful participation an important legal and policy consideration.

The materials reviewed for this submission do not establish that minors were meaningfully consulted on the proposal as a whole, including its age thresholds and account-access restrictions. We call on the Commission to publish a clear account of how children’s views were obtained, whose views were represented, how differing views were considered, and how that input influenced the proposal. If meaningful participation did not take place, the institutions should address that gap during the legislative process.

The Commission should not treat consultation with parents, educators or experts as a substitute for hearing directly from children. Children are affected by these measures in their own right, and their experience of online communication, education, culture and social participation is relevant to assessing both benefits and unintended consequences.

2.2 Parental control and children’s evolving capacities

Parental tools can help families manage online risks. However, a legal framework centred on guardian control can also restrict a child’s ability to communicate, access information and develop independence.

We call for clear safeguards to ensure that parental involvement remains proportionate and appropriate to the child’s age and circumstances. The legislation should avoid turning parental oversight into general surveillance of a child’s online activity.

The Act should distinguish between parental assistance, parental consent and continuous parental control. These are different forms of intervention and should not be treated as interchangeable. Any requirement for parental involvement should be linked to a clearly identified objective, with safeguards against unnecessary access to private communications and personal information.

2.3 Personalisation and autonomy

The proposal distinguishes between personalisation expressly selected by a minor and personalisation inferred from behavioural data. The European Pirates supports giving users meaningful control over recommendation systems and limiting practices that exploit behavioural information.

However, the default settings should not make user choice merely theoretical. Controls should be understandable, accessible and capable of being changed without manipulative prompts or repeated pressure.

We call for meaningful user choice, transparent explanations and safeguards against profiling that exploits vulnerabilities. The framework should recognise that users may reasonably prefer different types of feed and that personalisation is not inherently harmful in every context.

Recommendations

  • R2.1 Introduce a progressive-autonomy approach that allows children’s independence to increase with age and capacity.

  • R2.2 Ensure that parental controls are proportionate and do not amount to unnecessary surveillance of children’s private communications.

  • R2.3 Provide meaningful and accessible controls over personalisation, including clear choices about behavioural profiling.

  • R2.4 Publish a transparent account of the participation of children and young people in the development of the proposal, including how their views were considered and reflected in the final legislative text.

  • R2.5 Require that any restriction on a child’s autonomy be justified by the specific risk addressed and assessed against less restrictive alternatives.


Section 3: Freedom of association, contact and messaging restrictions

3.1 Protecting children from unwanted contact

The proposal contains restrictions intended to prevent unsolicited contact from strangers, limit contact suggestions and protect minors from unwanted invitations or interactions. The European Pirates recognises the importance of preventing grooming, harassment, exploitation and abuse.

However, restrictions on contact can also affect lawful communication and association. A system that blocks or limits interaction based on broad categories can prevent minors from joining communities, contacting people with shared interests or participating in civic, educational and cultural activities.

Freedom of association is a distinct concern, not merely a subcategory of parental control or platform safety. The Pirate Party’s commitment to free association and assembly means that restrictions on how people communicate and form communities must be examined in their own right.

The Act should distinguish between unsolicited harmful contact and ordinary communication that a minor wishes to receive. It should also consider the different contexts in which minors communicate, including educational groups, gaming communities, support networks, hobby communities and political or civic participation.

3.2 Proportionality and legal clarity

Contact restrictions should be sufficiently clear for users and providers to understand what is prohibited. Essential obligations should be set out in the legislation rather than left entirely to later technical measures or codes of conduct.

We call for restrictions to be based on identifiable risks and to include effective means of blocking, muting and reporting unwanted contact. The rules should not impose a blanket limitation on lawful communication where a less restrictive safeguard would adequately address the risk.

The proposal should also ensure that children can exercise age-appropriate control over their contacts as they mature. A child should not be permanently limited to a guardian-defined network solely because of their age if the relevant risks can be addressed through more targeted safeguards.

3.3 Blocking, group invitations and participation

Tools that allow users to block or mute others can improve safety. Restrictions on group invitations and contact suggestions may also reduce unwanted exposure. Their effectiveness will depend on implementation and on whether users retain meaningful control.

We recommend that the Commission assess the effects of these rules on legitimate group participation, including gaming groups, school and educational communities, cultural associations and peer-support networks. Safety measures should be designed to prevent abuse without unnecessarily isolating minors from lawful communities.

Recommendations

  • R3.1 State essential contact restrictions clearly in the operative text.

  • R3.2 Ensure that contact restrictions are proportionate to identifiable risks and allow age-appropriate autonomy.

  • R3.3 Provide accessible blocking, muting and reporting tools.

  • R3.4 Assess the effect of contact and group-invitation restrictions on freedom of association and participation in lawful online communities.

  • R3.5 Ensure that the implementation of contact safeguards does not unnecessarily prevent minors from joining educational, cultural, gaming, civic or support communities.


Section 4: Recommender systems, design mandates and user control

4.1 Restrictions on manipulative design

The proposal addresses features such as infinite scroll, certain notifications, streaks and reward mechanisms that can encourage excessive or compulsive use. The European Pirates supports measures to address manipulative design and considers that providers should take responsibility for the foreseeable effects of the systems they create.

However, dark patterns and addictive design do not affect only minors. They can undermine the autonomy, attention, wellbeing and decision-making of adults as well. These practices can be corrosive because they deliberately exploit behavioural tendencies to encourage continued engagement, repeated interaction or choices that may not reflect a user’s interests.

The case for addressing manipulative design should be grounded in the design practice and its effects, not solely in the age of the user. Child-specific safeguards may be justified where children face particular vulnerabilities, but the wider harm caused by dark patterns should not be treated as irrelevant to adults.

We call on the Commission to explain why the proposed design restrictions are limited or framed in relation to minors where the same practices can affect the autonomy of all users. The legislature should consider whether existing consumer-protection and digital-services rules can be enforced more effectively to address these practices across the user population.

The legislation should also be clear about the distinction between manipulative design and features that may be useful or harmless in some contexts. The purpose should be to prevent exploitative design, not to impose an inflexible technical specification on every service regardless of its function.

4.2 Recommender systems and the right to choose

The proposal’s approach to recommender systems and personalisation should provide meaningful choices for users. Users should be able to reset recommendations, choose non-profiling options where required and understand the factors that shape what they see.

However, a legal requirement that platforms adopt specified default settings or feed designs can also limit users’ ability to choose alternative tools or systems.

This raises a broader issue of user control and free software. We support the principle that users should be able to use, study, share and modify software, and to control the technology on which they rely. Regulation should address harmful outcomes without unnecessarily dictating a single technical design or preventing the development of alternative, open and user-controlled systems.

Where the Act requires particular recommender-system behaviour, the Commission should explain which outcomes are necessary for child safety and which implementation choices can reasonably remain open to providers and users. The legislation should be sufficiently clear to prevent harmful practices while allowing compliant open-source, interoperable and user-controlled alternatives.

4.3 Interoperability and independent choice

Where technically feasible, users should be able to use privacy-preserving tools that interact with the relevant service without requiring access to unnecessary personal data.

Any interoperability requirement must protect children’s data, private communications and service security. An open interface should not become a new channel through which third parties can profile minors.

The Digital Markets Act provides a useful framework for considering interoperability, but the specific needs of child safety and privacy must remain central.

The Commission should assess whether users can meaningfully exercise the choices promised by the Act without depending entirely on the platform’s own interface. Interoperability and open-source alternatives may strengthen user agency, but the requirements should be proportionate and should not create new privacy or security risks for minors.

Recommendations

  • R4.1 Retain an outcome-based test for compulsive or excessive use and make clear that the examples in Recital 27 are illustrative rather than exhaustive.

  • R4.2 Require meaningful and accessible controls for minors to reset recommendations and choose non-profiling options without manipulative interface design.

  • R4.3 Introduce proportionate interoperability requirements for covered services where they can strengthen user control, with strict safeguards for children’s data, private communications and security.

  • R4.4 Assess whether equivalent risks arising from games and AI companions are adequately addressed and introduce targeted safeguards where evidence demonstrates a material gap.

  • R4.5 Recognise that dark patterns and addictive design can harm adults as well as children, and assess the effective use of existing consumer-protection and digital-services legislation to address these practices.

  • R4.6 Ensure that design obligations focus on clearly defined safety outcomes and do not unnecessarily prevent open-source development, user-controlled technology or compliant alternative implementations.


Section 5: Gaming, digital ownership and access to online communities

The KIDS Act covers digital services beyond conventional social media, including online games and related services. Gaming should be assessed as a distinct area of concern, not merely as another example of a service to which age-assurance or design rules might apply.

This is particularly relevant to the European Pirates because of its engagement with Stop Killing Games and the substantial public support for the movement. The campaign has brought attention to the consequences of publishers withdrawing access to games, including the loss of access to products that people have purchased and the disappearance of online experiences that may depend on publisher-operated infrastructure. Those issues are not all caused by the KIDS Act, but they form part of the wider policy context in which regulation of online games should be assessed.

5.1 The effect of age-assurance and access rules on games

Games vary significantly in their design, audience, technical architecture and social features. Some are primarily single-player experiences; others depend on multiplayer interaction, user-created content, persistent online worlds or publisher-operated servers. A uniform compliance approach may have very different effects across these categories.

Where a game or gaming service is covered by age-assurance requirements, the Commission should assess the practical effect on adults and minors, including the burden on users, the availability of alternative verification methods, and the consequences of verification failure. The assessment should distinguish between age-restricted content, social features, multiplayer communication and access to the game itself.

A requirement intended to protect minors from a particular feature should not automatically result in the exclusion of users from unrelated features or from a game as a whole where a narrower measure would address the risk.

5.2 Gaming communities and freedom of association

Gaming communities can be important spaces for social interaction, collaboration and shared interests. Contact restrictions, group-invitation rules and age-related account limitations may affect how players find one another, participate in teams and maintain communities.

We call for a specific assessment of how the proposal affects multiplayer games, guilds, teams, community servers and other forms of organised play. Restrictions should be targeted at identifiable risks and should not unnecessarily prevent lawful participation in online communities.

5.3 Design obligations and user control

Games may use reward systems, notifications, streaks, progression mechanics, in-game purchases and other engagement features. Some may create risks of compulsive use or exploitation, while others are ordinary parts of gameplay. The appropriate response depends on the feature, its context and the evidence of harm.

The Act should not assume that all reward mechanics or engagement features have the same effect. It should distinguish manipulative practices from ordinary game design and assess whether the existing consumer-protection framework, including rules against unfair commercial practices, can address particular harms more effectively.

The Commission should also consider how compliance requirements affect independent developers, open-source projects and smaller studios. Requirements should be proportionate to actual risks and the capacity of the provider, without creating avoidable barriers to legitimate development or concentrating the market further in favour of large platforms.

5.4 Digital ownership, preservation and long-term access

The wider debate represented by Stop Killing Games highlights the importance of transparency about the conditions under which digital games remain accessible. Although the KIDS Act is not a general digital-ownership or game-preservation law, its impact on gaming should be assessed alongside these concerns.

Where the proposal creates new obligations that could affect server operation, service availability, game features or the relationship between publishers and users, the Commission should explain the expected consequences for long-term access and preservation. It should avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens that make it harder for independent communities to maintain lawful alternatives, while recognising that child-safety requirements may be necessary in services presenting demonstrable risks.

Recommendations

  • R5.1 Require a specific impact assessment of the KIDS Act’s application to online games, including age assurance, multiplayer communications, community features and access to games.

  • R5.2 Ensure that restrictions are targeted at the relevant risks and do not unnecessarily prevent access to unrelated game features or lawful gaming communities.

  • R5.3 Assess the impact of compliance requirements on independent developers, open-source projects and smaller studios, using a proportionate, risk-based approach.

  • R5.4 Consider the effects of the proposal on long-term game access and preservation, including the relationship between safety obligations, service operation and independent community initiatives.

  • R5.5 Explain how the KIDS Act’s gaming provisions interact with existing consumer-protection, data-protection and digital-services legislation.


Section 6: AI companions and general conversational chatbots

6.1 What Article 14 requires

Article 14 would require providers of AI companions and general conversational chatbots accessible to minors to avoid features that simulate interpersonal relations likely to create emotional dependencies. It also contains requirements concerning safe settings, reuse of prior interactions, access by younger children, pre-deployment evaluation and ongoing monitoring.

We recognise that these services can create distinctive risks, particularly where systems encourage a child to treat an AI system as a human relationship or use personal interaction history in ways that undermine the child’s interests. The objective of preventing manipulative or harmful design is legitimate. “Emotional dependencies” is central to the proposed prohibition, but the proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed operational threshold for determining when simulated interpersonal relations are likely to create such a dependency.

Without clearer criteria, providers may struggle to distinguish prohibited conduct from ordinary conversational warmth, accessibility features or legitimate support functions. Enforcement could also vary between authorities.

Technical concepts such as emotion emulation may inform the assessment, but they should not automatically become the legal definition of harmful emotional dependency.

The legislation should identify the behaviours that create the relevant risk and explain how context, user age, frequency, vulnerability and product design should be considered.

6.2 Testing and memory: duties that need a clear method

The proposal requires pre-deployment evaluation and ongoing monitoring. These requirements should specify the minimum evidence expected from providers.

Testing should examine realistic conditions, including repeated interactions, different age groups, foreseeable misuse, attempts to create emotional reliance, changes introduced through system updates, and the effects of memory and interaction history. Independent assessment should be required where the risk justifies it. Publication should not require disclosure of personal data, security-sensitive information or legitimate confidential material. However, the public should receive meaningful information about testing methods, scope, principal findings and corrective action.

These obligations should also be assessed in the context of the AI Act, which already establishes a risk-based regulatory framework for artificial intelligence. The Commission should identify the additional risks that Article 14 is intended to address and explain why the relevant AI Act obligations are insufficient on their own.

6.3 Memory and interaction history

The proposal’s safeguards concerning the reuse of prior interactions are important as conversational history may contain sensitive information and can make a system’s responses more influential over time.

Where memory is enabled, the legislation should clearly define permitted purposes, retention periods, deletion rights, user controls, restrictions on engagement optimisation, restrictions on targeted advertising, and safeguards concerning training and profiling.

Any safety-related exception should also be clearly defined. A vague exception could undermine the protection, while an absolute prohibition could prevent a narrowly justified use that genuinely protects the child.

6.4 The relationship with existing AI regulation

The Commission describes the KIDS Act as complementary to the AI Act. That relationship needs to be clear in practice, especially where the same conduct may engage both instruments.

Different maximum fine percentages do not by themselves establish that a provider will be punished twice. The relevant issue is how the legal bases interact, which authority is competent, how investigations are coordinated and how safeguards against duplicate punishment operate.

We call for the legislation to clearly delineate the relationship between Article 14 and the AI Act. Providers should be able to determine which obligations apply to the same conduct, authorities should have clear coordination arrangements, and penalties should be subject to coherent safeguards.

6.5 Delegated powers and codes

The proposal uses codes of conduct and delegated powers to allow the framework to respond to emerging risks. These mechanisms can be useful, but essential elements of restrictions should remain in the legislation or be subject to clear limits and scrutiny.

Codes should be developed transparently and should include meaningful participation by children’s organisations, civil society, researchers and affected users.

Where the Commission is given power to adapt the framework, the evidence supporting those changes should be made accessible and the public should have an opportunity to understand and respond to material changes.

6.6 Open-source and non-commercial systems

Open-source and non-commercial status does not automatically make an AI system safe. At the same time, imposing identical compliance procedures on every small, non-commercial project could create disproportionate burdens unrelated to the actual risk presented.

The European Pirates support proportionate requirements based on the system’s function, reach and risk while preserving safeguards against harmful uses. The aim should be to avoid both unnecessary burdens on legitimate open-source development and regulatory gaps for systems capable of causing serious harm.

Recommendations

  • R6.1 Clearly delineate the relationship between Article 14 and the AI Act, including applicable prohibitions, obligations, enforcement powers and safeguards against duplicate punishment.

  • R6.2 Define “emotional dependencies” through clear, evidence-based criteria and examples of prohibited conduct in the operative text or binding guidance.

  • R6.3 Establish minimum testing and monitoring requirements, including realistic repeated-interaction testing, documentation of findings, corrective action and independent assessment proportionate to risk.

  • R6.4 Define the permitted purposes and safeguards for memory, including retention, deletion, training, profiling and engagement optimisation.

  • R6.5 Require public reporting of non-confidential testing methods and outcomes, while protecting personal data, security-sensitive information and legitimate confidential material.

  • R6.6 Require transparent development of codes and delegated measures, with meaningful participation by children’s organisations, civil society and independent experts.

  • R6.7 Establish proportionate obligations for non-commercial and open-source systems based on their actual risk, without creating an automatic exemption from child-safety requirements.

  • R6.8 Explain the additional regulatory need addressed by Article 14 in light of existing AI Act obligations and publish the evidence supporting that assessment.


Section 7: Existing legislation, enforcement and the justification for a new Act

The KIDS Act should not be assessed in isolation. The EU already has legislation addressing significant parts of the regulatory landscape covered by the proposal. The Commission should identify which existing rules are insufficient, where enforcement has failed, and why the proposed new obligations are necessary.

This is not an argument that existing law automatically addresses every risk or that no additional legislation could be justified. It is a request for the Commission to demonstrate the regulatory gap and explain why the proposed measures are the appropriate response.

7.1 Existing legislation relevant to the proposal

The following instruments are particularly relevant to the issues addressed by the KIDS Act. Their scope and legal effect differ, and they should not be treated as interchangeable.

  • General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Regulation (EU) 2016/679. The GDPR governs the processing of personal data, including data minimisation, purpose limitation, lawful processing, security, transparency and the special protection applicable to children’s personal data. It is relevant to age assurance, profiling, recommender systems, personalisation, AI interaction histories and the processing of children’s information.

  • Digital Services Act (DSA), Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. The DSA establishes obligations for intermediary services and online platforms, including specific systemic-risk assessment and mitigation obligations for very large online platforms and search engines. It is relevant to risks to minors, recommender systems, transparency, audits and platform accountability. The precise obligations depend on the type and size of the service.

  • Artificial Intelligence Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. The AI Act establishes a framework for artificial intelligence based on different categories of risk and includes prohibitions, requirements and governance arrangements relevant to certain AI systems. It is particularly relevant to the KIDS Act’s provisions on AI companions and conversational chatbots. The Commission should explain which additional obligations are necessary and how the two instruments will operate together.

  • Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), Directive 2010/13/EU, as amended. The Directive includes protections for minors in relation to audiovisual media services and video-sharing platforms. Its scope is not identical to the KIDS Act, but it is relevant to the treatment of age-inappropriate content and safeguards for minors.

  • Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Directive 2005/29/EC, as amended. The Directive addresses unfair commercial practices, including misleading and aggressive practices. It is relevant to the assessment of manipulative commercial design, although it does not replace the need to assess the specific scope and limits of the proposed KIDS Act obligations.

  • European Digital Identity framework, including Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 amending the eIDAS framework. This framework is relevant to the development and operation of European Digital Identity Wallets. The Commission should explain how the KIDS Act’s age-assurance arrangements interact with the existing identity framework and how privacy protections will be maintained across the technical chain.

  • Digital Markets Act (DMA), Regulation (EU) 2022/1925. The DMA addresses contestability and fairness in digital markets and includes specific obligations for designated gatekeepers. It may be relevant to interoperability and user choice, although its scope and purpose differ from those of the KIDS Act.

  • The proposed Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, commonly referred to as “Chat Control” (COM(2022) 209). This remains a legislative proposal rather than an enacted regulation. It is relevant to the wider debate about online child protection, detection obligations, privacy and the interaction between child-safety objectives and communications confidentiality. Its current legislative status and scope should be clearly distinguished from binding law.

This list is not a claim that each instrument fully covers every measure in the KIDS Act. Rather, it identifies existing or proposed frameworks that the Commission should address when explaining the necessity, scope and design of the new regulation.

7.2 Why is a new Act necessary?

The Commission should explain which specific regulatory gaps the KIDS Act is intended to close. For each major obligation, the impact assessment should identify:

  • the risk or harm being addressed;

  • the existing legal provisions relevant to that risk;

  • how those provisions have been implemented and enforced in practice;

  • the evidence that the existing framework is insufficient;

  • the expected additional benefit of the new obligation; and

  • the likely consequences for privacy, autonomy, access, competition and the rights of adults and minors.

Where the problem is weak enforcement of existing rules, the Commission should explain why stronger enforcement, guidance, coordination or targeted amendments would not be sufficient. A new regulation should not be justified merely by showing that a problem exists; it should be justified by showing why the proposed instrument is necessary and proportionate to address it.

The Commission should also explain whether the KIDS Act will supplement, clarify, replace or create potential conflicts with existing obligations. Providers should not have to reconcile overlapping requirements without clear rules about which authority is competent, which legal obligation applies and how concurrent proceedings will be coordinated.

7.3 What evidence shows that existing law is not working?

We call on the Commission to make the evidence supporting the proposal accessible. This should include information about enforcement actions under the DSA and GDPR, the use of existing child-safety provisions, the effectiveness of current platform-design requirements, and any identified gaps in the regulation of AI companions and gaming services.

The assessment should distinguish between three different problems:

  1. A substantive gap: existing legislation does not impose a necessary obligation.

  2. An enforcement gap: a relevant obligation exists but is not being enforced effectively.

  3. An implementation gap: the law exists, but providers or authorities lack clear guidance, coordination or practical means of compliance.

Each problem may require a different response. The Commission should demonstrate which type of gap exists in each area rather than assuming that a new horizontal instrument is the best solution for every concern.

7.4 The relationship with pending legislation

The pending proposal commonly known as Chat Control should be considered as part of the wider EU approach to online child protection. We do not suggest that a pending proposal is equivalent to binding law. Rather, its existence raises questions about the cumulative effect of proposed measures addressing child safety, online communications, detection and privacy.

The Commission should explain how the KIDS Act relates to the objectives and scope of that proposal, whether the instruments would create overlapping obligations, and how the institutions intend to ensure consistency between the protection of children and the protection of private communications.

The assessment should be transparent about the legislative status of each instrument and should not rely on pending legislation as if its obligations were already in force.

7.5 A necessity and proportionality assessment

We call for a specific assessment of whether each major KIDS Act obligation is necessary and proportionate in light of existing legislation. That assessment should consider less restrictive alternatives, including improved enforcement, targeted amendments, clearer guidance, more effective coordination between authorities and measures focused on particular high-risk features.

Where the Commission concludes that new obligations are necessary, it should explain why those alternatives would not achieve the same objective and provide evidence of the expected benefits. The assessment should also examine unintended effects on adults, children’s autonomy, anonymity, open-source development, gaming and access to lawful online communities.

Recommendations

  • R7.1 Publish a provision-by-provision mapping of the KIDS Act against the GDPR, DSA, AI Act, AVMSD, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, European Digital Identity framework and other relevant existing law.

  • R7.2 Identify the specific regulatory or enforcement gap addressed by each major new obligation and provide evidence that the gap exists.

  • R7.3 Explain why stronger enforcement, guidance, coordination or targeted amendments to existing law would not adequately address each identified gap.

  • R7.4 Assess the interaction between the KIDS Act and pending proposals relevant to online child protection, including COM(2022) 209, while clearly distinguishing proposals from binding law.

  • R7.5 Require a necessity and proportionality assessment that considers less restrictive alternatives and the cumulative effects of existing and proposed legislation.

  • R7.6 Establish clear rules for coordination between authorities and for resolving overlaps between the KIDS Act and existing legal frameworks.


Section 8: Universal access, freedom of information and participation online

The KIDS Act’s account-access rules raise a wider question about access to the internet and the role of online services in everyday life. Digital services are used not only for entertainment, but also for education, communication, information, creativity, social connection and civic participation.

The European Pirates’ commitment to unencumbered access to the internet means that restrictions affecting whole age groups should be examined carefully. This does not mean that every service must be accessible to every person without restriction. It means that restrictions should be linked to a demonstrable risk, proportionate to that risk and designed to avoid unnecessary exclusion from lawful activities.

8.1 Access restrictions and universal access

The proposal’s age thresholds may exclude some minors from particular services or limit the way they can participate. The Commission should assess the consequences for children who rely on those services for education, peer support, community participation or access to information.

The comparison with net neutrality should be made carefully. The KIDS Act is not a rule governing how internet access providers treat traffic, and it should not be described as a direct violation of the legal rules on net neutrality simply because it restricts access to certain services. However, the broader principle that people should be able to access lawful online information and services remains relevant to the proportionality assessment.

8.2 Access to information and freedom of expression

Age-based restrictions can have consequences beyond the prevention of harmful content. A child may use the same service to obtain news, learn about a subject, communicate with peers or participate in a cultural or civic community. The Commission should assess the effects of the proposed restrictions on access to information and freedom of expression, including whether less restrictive safeguards could protect minors while preserving access to lawful content and communication.

8.3 Avoiding unnecessary exclusion

The Act should not create unnecessary barriers for users who cannot complete a particular age-assurance process, lack access to compatible devices, face accessibility barriers or have legitimate reasons to avoid a specific verification method. Where verification is required, there should be effective alternatives and a means of challenging incorrect results.

Recommendations

  • R8.1 Assess the effects of the proposed access restrictions on children’s access to education, information, communication, culture and civic participation.

  • R8.2 Require a proportionate approach that targets the relevant risks and considers less restrictive alternatives.

  • R8.3 Provide accessible alternatives and effective procedures for users who cannot complete or successfully challenge an age-assurance process.

  • R8.4 Evaluate the cumulative effects of age restrictions and verification requirements on lawful access to online services, while distinguishing those effects from the specific legal rules governing net neutrality.


Section 9: Governance, enforcement and democratic participation

9.1 Multiple regulatory frameworks and one provider

Article 34 distributes enforcement responsibilities across existing frameworks and authorities. This reflects the fact that the proposal covers different services and systems. However, a single product may involve a platform, an embedded AI system, age-assurance providers and data processing that engage more than one regulatory framework.

The proposal contains cooperation and coordination mechanisms. The issue is whether those mechanisms are sufficiently clear when several authorities may have jurisdiction over the same factual situation.

We call for a transparent procedure for identifying the lead authority where appropriate, referring matters between authorities, sharing relevant information lawfully, resolving disagreements and coordinating remedies.

9.2 The Commission’s rule-making and supervisory roles

The proposal gives the Commission powers to adopt delegated and implementing measures in specified areas. These powers are subject to procedural constraints and consultation mechanisms. Those safeguards should be recognised. The concern is whether the process provides sufficient transparency and participation when technical measures materially affect privacy, access to services or children’s rights.

Consultation with Member State experts is valuable, but it does not replace meaningful participation by civil society, children’s organisations, independent researchers and affected users.

We call for draft measures and supporting assessments to be published where legally possible, public comment on measures with material rights implications, and clear explanations of how public input was considered.

This is also a question of democratic participation. A regulation that determines how millions of people access and use digital services should not rely on technical decisions that are effectively insulated from public scrutiny. Essential restrictions should be determined by the legislature, while delegated and implementing measures should remain within clear legal limits and be supported by transparent evidence.

9.3 Enforcement timelines and practical effectiveness

The proposal provides an expedited procedure for certain Commission proceedings and includes target timelines. Where the text states that the Commission “shall endeavour” to meet a deadline, this should not be presented as an unconditional guarantee.

The relationship between the application date of substantive obligations and the date on which particular enforcement provisions apply should also be clear. Fast enforcement can be important where minors face serious harm. It must still provide procedural fairness, predictable processes and a meaningful opportunity for affected parties to respond.

9.4 Fines and procedural safeguards

The proposal uses different enforcement routes for different categories of service. Where one product or course of conduct falls under more than one regime, the legislation should clarify how the relevant penalties and procedural safeguards interact. A difference between maximum fine levels does not itself establish duplicate punishment. However, uncertainty about overlapping proceedings can create legal risk and inconsistent enforcement.

We call for the legislation to specify how authorities should account for penalties already imposed for the same conduct, how concurrent proceedings should be coordinated, which authority should take the lead, which procedural safeguards apply, and how the principle against duplicate punishment operates across regulatory frameworks.

9.5 A review that examines the full effect of the Act

The proposal provides for a future review under Article 41. That review should examine whether the Act has achieved its child-safety objectives without creating disproportionate effects on privacy, autonomy, access to information or freedom of association. It should cover age assurance, safety-by-design measures, account-access rules, contact restrictions, recommender-system requirements, AI companion obligations, enforcement effectiveness, interaction with the DSA and AI Act, fundamental-rights impacts, and the effects on different groups of minors.

A meaningful review requires evidence from those affected. Children and young people, civil society organisations, researchers, providers and relevant authorities should all have an opportunity to contribute. The review methodology, evidence considered and conclusions should be published, subject to appropriate safeguards.

The review should also evaluate the effects on adults who must undergo age assurance on covered services, as well as the impact on gaming, open-source development, universal access and the effectiveness of existing legislation. It should assess whether the Act has addressed demonstrated regulatory gaps and whether its benefits justify its costs and restrictions.

9.6 Participation in codes of conduct and implementation

The proposal invites a range of stakeholders, including civil society, industry, academia, parents and educators, to participate in codes of conduct. This is a positive element. However, participation in drafting does not necessarily provide a formal role in assessment, ongoing monitoring or decisions about whether a code remains sufficient.

We call for meaningful participation throughout the lifecycle of the codes. Drafts, consultation summaries and assessments should be published, subject to protection of legitimate confidential information. The Commission should explain how competing views were considered and why a particular code is regarded as sufficient.

9.7 Independent research and accountability

Independent research is necessary to determine whether the Act works in practice, identify emerging risks and detect unintended consequences. Research access must protect minors’ personal data, confidential information and service security. The absence of unrestricted access is not the problem by itself. The problem is the absence of a sufficiently clear and effective route for qualified researchers to study systemic effects.

We call for a safeguarded framework for vetted independent researchers, with clear eligibility criteria, data minimisation, security controls, protection against re-identification, transparent access decisions, and appropriate safeguards for confidential business and security information.

Recommendations

  • R9.1 Establish a clear coordination mechanism where the same service or course of conduct falls under the KIDS Act, DSA, AI Act or data-protection rules, including lead-authority and referral arrangements for overlapping cases.

  • R9.2 Specify how penalties and concurrent proceedings should be coordinated, including effective safeguards against duplicate punishment for the same conduct.

  • R9.3 Expand the statutory review under Article 41 to cover age assurance, AI companion obligations, enforcement effectiveness, fundamental-rights impacts, interaction with other EU legislation and stakeholder participation.

  • R9.4 Publish codes of conduct, consultation summaries and assessments, and ensure meaningful participation by minors’ organisations, civil society and independent experts throughout their development and evaluation.

  • R9.5 Establish a proportionate and safeguarded route for vetted independent researchers to assess the systemic effects of the Act.

  • R9.6 Invite public comment on delegated and implementing measures with material implications for privacy, access to services or children’s rights, and explain how that input was considered.

  • R9.7 Ensure that the review process itself includes structured participation by children, civil society, independent researchers and other affected stakeholders.

  • R9.8 Require the Commission to publish evidence of the regulatory gaps that justify the KIDS Act and explain how the Act will interact with existing and pending EU legislation.

  • R9.9 Ensure that the statutory review examines the impact on adults, gaming, open-source development, access to information and universal access, alongside the impact on minors.


Conclusion

The European Pirates support the objective of protecting children from harmful contact, manipulative design and unsafe digital services. The proposal contains measures that can advance that objective, including stronger provider responsibilities, restrictions on manipulative design, user control over personalisation and specific safeguards for AI companions.

The legislation should ensure that those protections are effective without creating unnecessary privacy risks or restricting children’s autonomy more than necessary.

Age assurance should be assessed across the full technical chain. Account and contact rules should reflect children’s evolving capacities. Design obligations should remain effective as services change and should be complemented by meaningful user control. The AI companion framework needs clearer standards and a more explicit relationship with the AI Act. Enforcement and code development should be transparent, coordinated and open to meaningful participation.

We also call for the legislature to address the broader concerns raised in this submission. The practical consequences of age assurance for adults must be acknowledged. The division of responsibilities between age-assurance providers and digital service providers must be codified in the Act. Children’s participation in the policy process must be demonstrated, and their views must be given appropriate weight. The impact of the proposal on gaming, online communities, open-source development and universal access must be assessed explicitly.

The Commission must also provide a clear account of why a new regulation is necessary alongside existing legislation. The GDPR, DSA, AI Act, AVMSD and consumer-protection rules already address significant parts of the digital environment covered by the proposal, although their scope and obligations differ. The Commission should identify the specific gaps that remain, explain whether those gaps arise from the law itself or from enforcement, and provide evidence that the proposed measures are necessary and proportionate. It should also explain how the KIDS Act would interact with pending proposals relevant to online child protection, including the proposal commonly known as Chat Control.

The legislature should not assume that the existence of serious online harms automatically justifies every proposed restriction. It should examine whether each measure is likely to work, whether less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same objective, and whether the benefits outweigh the consequences for privacy, autonomy, association, access and user control.

We call on the legislature to amend the proposal accordingly because child safety, privacy, autonomy and democratic accountability should reinforce one another. A framework designed to protect minors should also recognise them as rights-holders, preserve their ability to exercise greater autonomy as they mature, and ensure that the systems created in their name remain open to scrutiny.

The objective should be a framework that protects children effectively while preserving the fundamental rights of everyone who uses digital services. That requires clear legal duties, proportionate technical measures, effective enforcement of existing law, meaningful democratic participation and evidence that the additional restrictions imposed by the KIDS Act are genuinely necessary.


References

  1. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council: EU KIDS Act — “EU Keeping Internet Digital Spaces Accountable and Trustworthy”, COM(2026) 681 final, 17 September 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52026PC0681

  2. European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of impacts accompanying the proposal for the EU KIDS Act, SWD(2026) 681 final. COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Analysis of impacts Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council EU KIDS ACT - 'EU Keeping Internet Digital Spaces Accountable and Trustworthy' - Publications Office of the EU

  3. European Commission, Commission Recommendation (EU) 2026/1035 of 29 April 2026 on establishing a common framework for EU-wide Age Verification technologies. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026H1035

  4. European Pirate Party, Manifesto. [Insert the official manifesto URL used by THE EUROPEAN PIRATES.]

  5. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (General Data Protection Regulation). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj

  6. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Digital Services Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj

  7. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Artificial Intelligence Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj

  8. Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), as amended. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/13/oj

  9. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (Unfair Commercial Practices Directive). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2005/29/oj

  10. Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1183/oj

  11. Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Digital Markets Act). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj

  12. European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, COM(2022) 209 final.

  13. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child

  14. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 24. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT

  15. IEEE Std 7014-2024, IEEE Standard for Ethical Considerations in Emulated Empathy in Autonomous and Intelligent Systems

  16. European Commission, “The EU approach to age verification”. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-age-verification